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1 This explanation has been artic-
ulated in a number of recent
papers. See, for example,
Azariadis and Smith (forthcom-
ing), Boyd and Smith (forth-
coming), and Schreft and
Smith (forthcoming and
1994).
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A
consensus among economists seems
to be that high rates of inﬂation
cause “problems,” not just for some
individuals, but for aggregate economic
performance. There is much less agree-
ment about what these problems are and
how they arise. We propose to explain
how inﬂation adversely affects an economy
by arguing that high inﬂation rates tend to
exacerbate a number of ﬁnancial market
frictions. In doing so, inﬂation interferes
with the provision of investment capital,
as well as its allocation.1 Such interference
is then detrimental to long-run capital for-
mation and to real activity. Moreover, high
enough rates of inﬂation are typically ac-
companied by highly variable inﬂation and
by variability in rates of return to saving
on all kinds of ﬁnancial instruments. We
argue that, by exacerbating various ﬁnan-
cial market frictions, high enough rates of
inﬂation force investors’ returns to display
this kind of variability. It seems difﬁcult
then to prevent the resulting variability in
returns from being transmitted into real
activity.
Unfortunately, for our understanding
of these phenomena, the effects of perma-
nent increases in the inﬂation rate for
long-run activity seem to be quite compli-
cated and to depend strongly on the initial
level of the inﬂation rate. For example,
Bullard and Keating (forthcoming) ﬁnd
that a permanent, policy-induced increase
in the rate of inﬂation raises the long-run
level of real activity for economies whose
initial rate of inﬂation is relatively low. For
economies experiencing moderate initial
rates of inﬂation, the same kind of change
in inﬂation seems to have no signiﬁcant
effect on long-run real activity. However,
for economies whose initial inﬂation rates
are fairly high, further increases in inﬂa-
tion signiﬁcantly reduce the long-run level
of output. Any successful theory of how
inﬂation affects real activity must account
for these nonmonotonicities.
Along the same lines, Bruno and 
Easterly (1995) demonstrate that a num-
ber of economies have experienced sus-
tained inﬂations of 20 percent to 30 per-
cent without suffering any apparently
major adverse consequences. However,
once the rate of inﬂation exceeds some
critical level (which Bruno and Easterly
estimate to be about 40 percent), signiﬁ-
cant declines occur in the level of real ac-
tivity. This seems consistent with the re-
sults of Bullard and Keating.
Evidence is also accumulating that in-
ﬂation adversely affects the allocative func-
tion of capital markets, depressing the level
of activity in those markets and reducing
investors’ rates of return. Again, however,
these effects seem highly nonlinear. In a
cross-sectional analysis, for example, Boyd,
Levine, and Smith (1995) divide countries
into quartiles according to their average
rates of inﬂation. The lowest inﬂation
quartile has the highest level of ﬁnancial
market activity, and the highest inﬂation
quartile has the lowest level of ﬁnancial
market activity. However, the two middle
quartiles display only very minor differ-
ences. Thus for the ﬁnancial system, as for
real activity, there seem to be threshold ef-
fects associated with the inﬂation rate.
Moreover, as we will show, high rates
of inﬂation tend to depress the real returns
equity-holders receive and to increase
their variability. In Korea and Taiwan,
there were fairly pronounced jumps in the
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rate of inﬂation in 1988 and 1989, respec-
tively. In each country, before those dates,
inﬂation’s effects on rates of return to eq-
uity, rate of return volatility, and transac-
tions volume appear to be insigniﬁcant.
After the dates in question, these effects
are generally highly signiﬁcant. Thus it
seems possible that—to adversely affect
the ﬁnancial system—inﬂation must be
“high enough.”
Why does inﬂation affect ﬁnancial
markets and real activity this way? We
produce a theoretical model in which—
consistent with the evidence—higher in-
ﬂation reduces the rate of return received
by savers in all ﬁnancial markets. By itself
this effect might be enough to reduce sav-
ings and hence the availability of invest-
ment capital. However, we do not believe
that this explanation by itself is very plau-
sible, for two reasons. First, to explain the
nonmonotonicities we have noted, the sav-
ings function would have to bend back-
ward. Little or no empirical evidence ex-
ists to support this notion. Second, almost
all empirical evidence suggests that sav-
ings is not sufﬁciently sensitive to rates of
return to make this a plausible mechanism
for inﬂation to have large effects. Thus an
alternative mechanism is needed.
We present a model in which inﬂation
reduces real returns to savings and, via this
mechanism, exacerbates an informational
friction afﬂicting the ﬁnancial system. The
particular friction modeled is an adverse
selection problem in capital markets. How-
ever, the speciﬁc friction seems not to be
central to the results we obtain.2 What is
central is that the severity of the ﬁnancial
market friction is endogenous and varies
positively with the rate of inﬂation.
In this speciﬁc model, higher rates of
inﬂation reduce savers’ real rates of return
and lower the real rates of interest that
borrowers pay. By itself, this effect makes
more people want to be borrowers and
fewer people want to be savers. However,
people who were not initially getting
credit represent “lower quality borrowers”
or, in other words, higher default risks. In-
vestors will be uninterested in making
more loans to lower quality borrowers at
lower rates of interest and therefore must
do something to keep them from seeking
external ﬁnance. The speciﬁc response
here is that markets ration credit, and
more severe rationing accompanies higher
inﬂation. This rationing then limits the
availability of investment capital and re-
duces the long-run level of real activity. In
addition, when credit rationing is sufﬁ-
ciently severe, it induces endogenously
arising volatility in rates of return to sav-
ings. This volatility must be transmitted to
real activity and, hence, to the rate of in-
ﬂation. Variable inﬂation therefore neces-
sarily accompanies high enough rates of
inﬂation, as we observe in practice.
This story, of course, does not explain
why these effects are strongest at high—
and not at low—rates of inﬂation. The ex-
planation for this lies in the fact that—at
low rates of inﬂation—our analysis sug-
gests that credit market frictions are poten-
tially innocuous. Thus at low rates of inﬂa-
tion, credit rationing might not emerge at
all, and none of the mechanisms men-
tioned in the previous paragraph would be
operative. In this case our economy would
act as if it had no ﬁnancial market frictions.
When this occurs, our model possesses a
standard Mundell-Tobin effect that makes
higher inﬂation lead to higher long-run lev-
els of real activity .3 However, once inﬂation
exceeds a certain critical level, credit ra-
tioning must be observed, and higher rates
of inﬂation can have the adverse conse-
quences noted above.
Finally, our analysis suggests that a
certain kind of “development trap” phe-
nomenon is ubiquitous, particularly at 
relatively high rates of inﬂation.4 We often
observe that economies whose perfor-
mance looks fairly similar at some point 
in time—like Argentina and Canada circa
1940—strongly diverge in terms of their
subsequent development. Although 
this is clearly often because of differences
in government policies, presumably many
governments confront similar policy op-
tions. One would thus like to know
whether intrinsically similar economies
can experience divergent economic perfor-
mance for purely endogenous reasons. 
2 The same phenomena we re-
port here occur in the presence
of a costly state veriﬁcation
problem (Boyd and Smith forth-
coming), or in a model where
spatial separation and limited
communication affect the ﬁnan-
cial system (Schreft and Smith
forthcoming and 1994).
3 In particular, in the absence of
ﬁnancial market frictions, our
model reduces to one in which
higher rates of inﬂation (easier
monetary policy) stimulates
real output growth. This occurs
in a variety of monetary growth
models: see Mundell (1965);
Tobin (1965); Diamond
(1965); or especially Azariadis
(1993) (for an exposition);
Sidrauski (1967); and Shell,
Sidrauski, and Stiglitz (1969).
4 See Azariadis and Drazen
(1990) for one of the original
theoretical expositions of devel-
opment traps.MAY/ JU N E 1 9 9 6
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The answer in models with ﬁnancial mar-
ket frictions is that this can occur fairly
easily: When the severity of an economy’s
ﬁnancial market frictions is endogenous, it
is possible that—for endogenous reasons—
the friction is perceived to be more or 
less severe. If it is perceived to be more
(less) severe, ﬁnancial markets provide less
(more) investment capital. The result is a
reduced (enhanced) level of real economic
performance. This validates the original
perception that the friction was (was not)
severe. Thus, as we show, development
trapsshould be expected to be quite 
common.
The remainder of the article proceeds
as follows: In the ﬁrst section we lay out a
theoretical model that illustrates the argu-
ments just given, while in the second sec-
tion we describe an equilibrium of the
model. In the third section we discuss how
inﬂation affects the level of real activity
when the ﬁnancial market friction is not
operative, while in the fourth section we
take up the same issue when it is. In the
ﬁfth section we examine when the friction
will or will not be operative and derive the
theoretical implications we have already
discussed. In the sixth section we show
that an array of empirical evidence sup-
ports these implications. In the ﬁnal sec-
tion we offer our conclusions.
A SIMPLE 
ILLUSTRATIVE MODEL
The purpose of this section is to pre-
sent a model that illustrates how inﬂation
interacts with a particular ﬁnancial market
friction. This friction is purposely kept
very simple in order to highlight the eco-
nomic mechanisms at work. Later we will
argue that these mechanisms are operative
very generally in economies where ﬁnan-
cial markets are characterized by informa-
tional asymmetries.
The Environment
The economy is populated by an inﬁ-
nite sequence of two period lived, overlap-
ping generations. Each generation is iden-
tical in its size and composition. We de-
scribe the latter below and index time pe-
riods by t = 0, 1, ....
At each date, a single ﬁnal commodity
is produced via a technology that utilizes
homogeneous physical capital and labor as
inputs. An individual producer employing
Kt units of capital and Nt units of labor at t
produces F(Kt,Nt) units of ﬁnal output.
For purposes of exposition, we will as-
sume that F has the constant elasticity of
substitution form
(1) F(K,N) = [aK +bN ]
1/ ,
and we will assume throughout that  < 0
holds.5 Deﬁning k º K/N to be the capital-
labor ratio, it will often be convenient to
work with the intensive production func-
tion f(k) º F(k,1). Clearly, here
(1¢) f(k) = [ak +b].
Finally, to keep matters notationally
simple, we assume that capital depreciates
completely in one period.6
Each generation consists of two types
of agents. Type 1 agents—who constitute a
fraction  Î(0,1) of the population—are
endowed with one unit of labor when
young and are retired when old. We as-
sume that all young-period labor is sup-
plied inelastically. In addition, type 1
agents have access to a linear technology
for storing consumption goods whereby
one unit stored at t yields x > 0 units of
consumption at t + 1.
Type 2 agents represent a fraction 
1 - of each generation. These agents
supply one unit of labor inelastically when
old and have no young-period labor en-
dowment.7 In addition, type 2 agents have
no access to the technology for storing
goods. They do, on the other hand, have
access to a technology that converts one
unit of ﬁnal output at t into one unit of
capital at t + 1. Only type 2 agents have
access to this technology.
We imagine that any agent who owns
capital at t can operate the ﬁnal goods pro-
duction process at that date. Thus type 2
agents are producers in old age. It entails
5 If r ³0, our analysis is a spe-
cial case of that in Azariadis
and Smith (forthcoming). We
therefore restrict attention here
to r <0. The assumption that 
r <0holds implies that the
elasticity of substitution be-
tween capital and labor is less
than unity. Empirical evidence
supports such a supposition.
6 It is easy to verify that this as-
sumption implies no real loss of
generality.
7 This assumption implies that all
capital investment must be ex-
ternally ﬁnanced, as will soon be
apparent. This provides the link
between ﬁnancial market condi-
tions and capital formation that
is at the heart of our analysis.no loss of generality to assume that all
such agents run the production process
and work for themselves in their second
period.
With respect to agents’ objective func-
tions, it is simplest to assume that all
agents care only about old-age consump-
tion and that they are risk neutral.8 These
assumptions are easily relaxed.
The central feature of the analysis is
the presence of an informational friction
affecting the ﬁnancing of capital invest-
ments. In particular, we assume that each
agent is privately informed about his own
type. We also assume that nonmarket ac-
tivities, such as goods storage, are unob-
servable, while all market transactions are
publicly observed. Thus, to emphasize, an
agent’s type and storage activity are private
information, while all market transac-
tions—in both labor and credit markets—
are common knowledge. This set of as-
sumptions is intended to keep the
informational asymmetry in our model
very simple: Since type 2 agents cannot
work when young, they cannot credibly
claim to be type 1. However, type 1 agents
might claim to be type 2 when young. We
now describe what happens if they do so.
If a type 1 agent wishes to claim to be
type 2, he cannot work when young, and
he must borrow the same amount as type 2
agents do. Since type 1 agents are incapable
of producing physical capital, it will ulti-
mately be discovered that they have mis-
represented their type. To avoid punish-
ment, we assume that a dissembling type 1
agent absconds with his loan, becoming
autarkic and ﬁnancing old-age consump-
tion by storing the proceeds of his borrow-
ing. Dissembling type 1 agents never repay
loans. Notice, however, that since type 2
agents cannot store goods, they will never
choose to abscond, and hence they always
repay their loans.9 Obviously, lenders will
want to avoid making loans to dissembling
type 1 agents. How they do so is the sub-
ject of the section on equilibrium condi-
tions in ﬁnancial markets.
It remains to describe the initial con-
ditions of our economy. At t = 0 there is an
initial old generation where each agent is
endowed with one unit of labor (supplied
inelastically) and with K0 > 0 units of capi-
tal. No other agents are endowed at any
date with capital or consumption goods.
Trading
Three kinds of transactions occur in
this economy. First, ﬁnal goods and ser-
vices are bought and sold competitively.
We let pt denote the dollar price at t of a
unit of ﬁnal output. Second, producers
hire the labor of young type 1 agents in a
competitive labor market, paying the real
wage rate wt at t. And third, young
(nondissembling) type 1 workers save
their entire labor income, which they sup-
ply inelastically in capital markets, thereby
acquiring claims on type 2 agents—and
possibly on some dissembling type 1
agents—and claims on the government,
such as money or national debt. The
model we present here is not rich enough
to capture any distinction between differ-
ent types of ﬁnancial claims, such as debt
or equity.10 We thus think of young agents
as simply acquiring a generalized claim
against producers of capital. It entails no
loss of generality to think of ﬁnancial mar-
ket activity as being intermediated, say
through banks, mutual funds, or pension
funds. We assume there is free entry into
the activity of intermediation. We also let
Rt+1 be the real gross rate of return earned
by intermediaries between t and t + 1 on
(nondefaulted) investments, and we let rt+1
be the real gross rate of return earned by
young savers. After describing government
policy, we return to a description of equi-
librium conditions in these markets.
The Government
We let Mt denote the outstanding per
capita money supply at t. At t = 0 the initial
old agents are endowed with the initial per
capita money supply, M 1 > 0. Thereafter,
the money supply evolves according to
(2) Mt+1 = Mt,
where > 0 is the exogenously given gross
8 Risk neutrality implies that
there are no potential gains
from the use of lotteries in the
presence of private information.
9 The hallmark of models of
credit rationing based on ad-
verse selection or moral hazard
is that different agents have dif-
ferent probabilities of loan re-
payment and hence regard the
interest rate dimensions of a
loan contract differently. See,
for instance, Stiglitz and Weiss
(1981) or Bencivenga and
Smith (1993). Ours is the sim-
plest possible version of such a
scenario: Type 2 agents repay
loans with probability one,
while type 1 agents default
with the same probability.
Matters are somewhat different
in models of credit rationing
based on a costly state veriﬁca-
tion problem in ﬁnancial mar-
kets. See, for instance,
Williamson (1986 and 1987)
and Labadie (1995). We will
discuss such models brieﬂy in
the conclusion.
10For models of informational 
frictions that do generate debt
and equity claims, see Boot and
Thakor (1993), Dewatripont
and Tirole (1994), Chang
(1986), or Boyd and Smith
(1995a and b).
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12rate of money creation. We assume that the
government makes a once and for all
choice of  at t = 0: In steady-state equilib-
ria the (gross) rate of inﬂation will equal  .
Our ultimate purpose is to examine
how different choices of  affect ﬁnan-
cial markets and, through this channel,
capital formation. To make our results as
stark as possible, we assume that the gov-
ernment uses the proceeds of money cre-
ation to ﬁnance a subsidy to private capital
formation. It should then be transparent
that any adverse effects of inﬂation are a
result of the presence of inﬂation alone
and not what the revenue from the in-
ﬂation tax is used for. More speciﬁcally,
then, we assume that any monetary injec-
tions (withdrawals) occur via lump-sum
transfers to young agents claiming to be
type 2. Genuine type 2 agents will use
these transfers entirely to invest in capital;
hence government policy here consists of a
capital subsidy program ﬁnanced by print-
ing money. If we let  t denote the real
value of the transfer received by young
type 2 agents at t, and we let  t Î [0,1] de-
note the fraction of dissembling type 1
agents in the time t population, then the
government budget constraint implies that
the real value of transfers, per capita,
equals the real value, per capita, of
seigniorage revenue. Thus
(3) [(1 - ) + t] t = (Mt - Mt-1)/pt
must hold at all dates. If we let mt º Mt/pt
denote time t real balances, equations 2
and 3 imply that




Let btdenote the real value of borrowing
by young type 2 agents att. These agents
also receive a transfer  t.All resources ob-
tained by these individuals are used to fund
capital investments att. Each old producer
att+1 will hence have the capital stock
(4) Kt+1 = bt + t.
Let Lt denote the quantity of young
labor hired by a representative producer at
t. Each such producer combines this with
his own unit of labor to obtain Nt = Lt + 1
units of labor services. Then the producer’s
proﬁts, net of loan repayments, are
F(Kt,Lt+1) - wtLt - Rtbt 1 since an interest
obligation of Rtbt 1 was incurred at t - 1.
Producers wish to maximize old-period in-
come. At t, bt 1 is given by past credit ex-
tensions, so that the only remaining choice
variable is Lt. Proﬁts are maximized when
(5) wt = F2(Kt,Lt+1) = F2(Kt/Nt,1)
= f(kt) - ktf¢(kt)=b(akt + b)
(1- )/
º w(kt)
where kt º Kt/Nt is the capital labor ratio.
Equation 5 asserts the standard result that
labor earns its marginal product.
For future reference, it will be useful
to have an expression for the consump-
tion, c
2





The ﬁrst equality in equation 6 follows
from Euler’s law, while the second follows
from equations 3, 4, and 5. Equation 6 
asserts that old producers have income
equal to the marginal product of their own
labor, plus the value of the capital paid 
for through transfer payments [F1(×) t 1],
plus the net income obtained from 
capital attained through borrowing 
[(F1(×) - Rt)bt 1].
Financial Markets
Intermediaries face a fairly standard
adverse selection problem in ﬁnancial 
markets.11 If they lend to a dissembling
type 1 agent, the loan will not be repaid.12
Hence it is desirable not to lend to these
agents, but at the same time such agents
cannot be identiﬁed ex ante. Intermedi-
11For a canonical adverse selec-
tion model, see Rothschild and
Stiglitz (1976).
12It is easy to verify that nondis-
sembling type 1 agents will not
wish to borrow if Rt+1³
max(rt+1,x). This condition
will hold in equilibrium.
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13aries will hence structure ﬁnancial con-
tracts to deter type 1 agents from dissem-
bling or, in other words, to induce self-
selection (only type 2 agents choose to ac-
cept funding).
Using typical assumptions in econ-
omies with adverse selection, we assume
that intermediaries announce ﬁnancial
contracts consisting of a loan quantity bt,
and an interest rate (or return to the 
intermediary) of Rt+1. Each intermediary
announces such a contract, taking the
contracts offered by other intermediaries
as given. Hence we seek a Nash equilib-
rium set of ﬁnancial contracts. On the de-
posit side we assume that intermediaries
behave competitively (that is, each inter-
mediary assumes it can raise all the funds
it wants at the going rate of return on 
savings rt+1).
One objective of intermediaries is to
induce self-selection. This requires that
type 1 agents prefer to work when young
and save their young-period income rather
than to borrow bt, receive the transfer  t,
and abscond. If they work when young
and save the proceeds, their utility is rt+1wt.
If they borrow bt, obtain the transfer  t,
and abscond, their utility is x(bt+ t). Hence
self-selection requires that
(7) rt+1wt ³ x(bt+ t).
Standard arguments13 establish that equa-
tion 7 holds in any Nash equilibrium and
that all type 1 agents are deterred from dis-
sembling. Hence  t = 0 holds at all dates.
In addition, since there is free entry
into intermediation, all intermediaries
must earn zero proﬁts in equilibrium.
Since  t = 0, this simply requires that
(8) Rt+1 = rt+1.
An equilibrium in ﬁnancial markets
now requires that ﬁve conditions be satis-
ﬁed. First, given rt+1 and  t, the quantity of
funds obtained in the marketplace by each
type 2 agent must satisfy equation 7. Sec-
ond, equation 8 must hold. Third, sources
and uses of funds must be equal. Sources
of funds at each date are simply the sav-
ings of young type 1 agents, which in per
capita terms are wt. Uses of funds are
loans to borrowers [(1 - )bt per capita],
plus real balances (mt per capita), plus per
capita storage (st). Thus equality between
sources and uses of funds obtains if and
only if
(9) w(kt) = (1 - )bt + mt + st.
The fourth condition is that type 2
agents will be willing to borrow if and
only if
(10) F1(Kt,Nt) = F1(Kt/Nt,1) = f¢(kt)
= a[a+bk ]
(1 )/ ³ Rt+1 = rt+1
holds14. Equation 10 implies that type 2
agents perceive nonnegative proﬁts from
borrowing. And ﬁnally, type 1 agents are
willing to supply funds to intermediaries if
and only if the return they receive is at
least as large as the return available on al-
ternative savings instruments (money and
storage). This requires that
(11a) rt+1 ³ pt/pt+1
(11b) rt+1 ³ x.
We will want agents to hold money in
equilibrium. Hence equation 11a must al-
ways hold with equality. We will assume
that equation 11b is a strict inequality;
hence in equilibrium st = 0 (storage is
dominated in rate of return). Equation 11b
is validated, at least near steady states, by
the assumption that
(a1) 1/x > .
We will henceforth impose equation a1.1 5
Some Implications
We now know that in equilibrium all
young type 1 agents supply their labor to
producers. Hence labor market clearing re-
quires that the per capita labor demand of
producers [(1 - )Lt] equals the per capita
13See Rothschild and Stiglitz
(1976), or in this speciﬁc
context, Azariadis and Smith
(forthcoming).
14See equation 6.
15An additional requirement of
equilibrium is that intermedi-
aries perceive no incentive to
“pool” dissembling type 1
agents with type 2 agents 
and to charge an interest rate
that compensates for the de-
faults by dissembling type 1
agents. Azariadis and Smith
(forthcoming) show that there
is no such incentive if
f¢(kt+1) £ rt+1/(1-l)
holds for all t.
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14labor supply of young type 1 agents ( ).
Therefore,
(12) Lt = /(1 - ).
It is an immediate implication that Nt = 1
+ Lt = 1/(1 - ) and that
(13) kt º Kt/Nt = (1 - )Kt.
In addition, under equation a1, st=0 holds,
so that equation 9 becomes
(9¢) (1 - )bt = w(kt) - mt.
Now note that kt+1 = (1 - )Kt+1 =
(1 - )(bt+ t). Using this fact in equation
9¢, we obtain
(9²) kt+1 = w(kt) - mt - (1 - ) t.
Finally, we know that  t = 0. Using this
fact in equation 1¢ and substituting the re-
sult into equation 9² yields
(14) kt+1 = w(kt) - mt/ .
It is also possible to derive some fur-
ther implications from the preceding dis-
cussion. Equations 10 and 11a at equality,
imply that
(15) f¢(kt+1) ³ rt+1 = pt/pt+1.
We can now use the identity pt/pt+1 º
(Mt+1/pt+1)(pt/Mt)(Mt/Mt+1) º mt+1/ mt to
write equation 15 as
(15¢) f¢(kt+1) ³ mt+1/ mt.
Finally, equation 7 must hold in equilib-
rium. Substituting equation 4 into equa-
tion 7, and using Kt+1 = kt+1/(1 - ), we ob-
tain the equivalent condition
(16) rt+1w(kt) ³ xkt+1/(1- ).
Equation 11a also implies an alternative
form of equation 16:
(16¢) [mt+1/ mt]w(kt) ³ xkt+1/(1- ).
We can now reduce our search for an
equilibrium to the problem of ﬁnding a
sequence {kt, mt} that satisﬁes equations
14, 15¢, and 16¢ at all dates, with k0 > 0
given as an initial condition. We now
make an additional comment. If equation
15¢ is a strict inequality at any date,
young type 2 agents perceive positive
proﬁts to be made from borrowing and
hence will want to borrow an arbitrarily
large amount. Because this is not possible,
if equation 15¢ is a strict inequality, their
borrowing must be constrained. The rele-
vant constraint is equation 7. In this case
equation 7 at equality determines bt,
and equation 16¢ will hold with equality.
In equilibrium, at least one of the condi-
tions (equations 15¢ or 16¢) must thus
hold with equality. If equation 15¢ is an
equality, the equilibrium coincides with
standard equilibria that obtain in similar
economies with no informational asym-
metries.16 In this case we say the equilib-
rium is Walrasian. If equation 15¢ holds
as a strict inequality, then equation 16¢ is
an equality. We refer to this situation as
credit rationing.
WALRASIAN EQUILIBRIA
We now describe sequences that sat-
isfy equations 14 and 15¢ at equality. For
the present we do not impose equation 16¢:
This amounts to assuming that agents’
types are publicly observed. In the section
on the endogeneity of ﬁnancial market fric-
tions, we ask when such sequences will
also satisfy equation 16 or, in other words,
when Walrasian resource allocations can be
sustained even in the presence of the infor-
mational asymmetry. We begin with steady-
state equilibria, and then brieﬂy describe
the nature of equilibrium paths that ap-
proach the steady state. Because the mater-
ial in this section is quite standard,17 we at-
tempt to present it fairly concisely .
Steady States
In a steady state kt and mt are constant.
Hence equation 15¢ at equality reduces to
16See, for example, Diamond
(1965), Tirole (1985), 
or Azariadis (1993, chapter
26.2).
17See, for instance, Diamond
(1965), Tirole (1985), or
Azariadis (1993, chapter
26.2).
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15(17) f¢(k) = 1/ = pt/pt+1,
while equation 14 becomes
(18) m = [ w(k) - k].
It is immediately apparent from equa-
tion 17 that increases in the rate of money
growth (and inﬂation),  , increase the
steady-state capital-labor ratio, per capita
output, and productivity of labor. This is
true for all rates of money growth satisfying
equation a1. Because the empirical evidence
cited in the introduction strongly suggests
that higher inﬂation can lead to higher long-
run levels of real activity onlyif initial rates
of inﬂation are relatively low, it is clear that
our model cannot confront the whole array
of empirical experience in the absence of the
informational asymmetry.
For future reference, it will be conve-
nient to give an explicit form for the capi-
tal stock (or variables related to it) as a
function of the money growth rate. To this
end we deﬁne the variable
(19) zt º (b/a)kt º w(kt) / ktf (kt).
It is readily veriﬁed that zt is simply the ra-
tio of labor’s share to capital’s share: The as-
sumption that  < 0 implies that zt is an in-
creasing function of kt. Hence movements
in zt simply reﬂect similar movements in kt.







Then, if we let z
*( ) denote the value of z
satisfying equation 17 for each  , we have
that
(20) z
*( ) = [a
1/ (1/ )]
/(1- ) - 1.
Equations 19 and 20 give the capital stock
in a Walrasian steady state.
Dynamics
Equations 14 and 15¢ at equality de-
scribe how the economy evolves given 
k0 and m0: the initial capital-labor ratio
and initial real balances. The initial price
level is endogenous, and so m0 º M0/p0
is endogenous.
It is easy to show that the monetary
steady state is a saddle or, in other words,
that there is only one choice of m0that
averts a hyperinﬂation where money asymp-
totically loses all value. Thus nonhyperin-
ﬂationary equilibria are determinate (only
one possible equilibrium path approaching
the monetary steady state exists), and it 
is possible to show that the steady state is
necessarily approached monotonically.
Walrasian equilibria thereforecannotdis-
play economic ﬂuctuations in output, real
returns to investors, or the rate of inﬂation.
Summary
Walrasian equilibria are unique.
Growth traps are therefore impossible.
Moreover, Walrasian equilibria do not 
display economic ﬂuctuations. Finally,
Walrasian equilibria have the feature that
increases in the long-run rate of inﬂation




In this section we investigate se-
quences {kt,mt} that satisfy equations 14
and 16¢ at equality at all dates. In the sec-
tion on the endogeneity of ﬁnancial mar-
ket frictions, we then examine when a
Walrasian equilibrium or an equilibrium
with credit rationing will actually obtain.
As before, we begin with steady-state equi-
libria.
Steady States
When kt and mt are constant, equation
16¢ at equality implies that the steady-state
capital-labor ratio satisﬁes
(21) w(k)/k = x /(1 - ).
Equation 21 says that the capital stock is
determined by how ﬁnancial markets con-
trol borrowing to induce self-selection.
The rate of inﬂation matters because it af-
fects the rate of return that nondissem-
bling type 1 agents receive on their sav-
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16ings. As inﬂation rises, this return falls,18
with the consequence that the utility of
working and saving declines. To prevent
type 1 agents from dissembling, the utility
of doing so must also fall. Equation 21 de-
scribes the consequences for the per capita
capital stock.
It will be convenient to transform
equation 21 as follows: First note that it
can be written as
(21¢) [w(k)/kf¢(k)]f¢(k) = x /(1 - ).
Second, given equation 19 and our previous




This observation allows us to rewrite the
equilibrium condition equation 21¢as
(22) a
1/ [x /(1 - )] 
= z(1+z)
(1 )/ º H(z).
Equation 22 determines the steady-state
equilibrium value(s) of z as a function of
the long-run inﬂation rate  . Equation 19
then gives the steady-state per capita capi-
tal stock. Steady-state real balances are de-
termined from equation 14 with k and m
constant:
(23) m = [ w(k) - k].
Equation 21 permits us to rewrite equa-
tion 23 as
(23¢) m = k{[x /(1 - )] - 1}.
For future reference, it will be convenient
to deﬁne the function A( ) by
(24) A( ) º [x /(1 - )] .
We can now state our ﬁrst result.
RESULT 1. Deﬁne  ˆ by
Then if  £ ˆ, there exists a solution to equa -
tion 22. If, in addition,
(a2) A( ) > 1
all solutions to equation 22 yield positive levels
of real balances.
Result 1 is proved in the Appendix.
As the Appendix establishes, the 
function H(z) deﬁned in equation 22 has
the conﬁguration depicted in Figure 1. 
In particular,
and H attains a unique maximum at z = - .
Thus, if
(26) H(- ) ³ a
1/ [x /(1 - )]
equation 22 has a solution, which is de-
picted in Figure 1. If < ˆ where
ˆ=[(1 - )/x]a
1/ H(- ),
there will be exactly two solutions to equa-




The conditions A( ) > 1 and  £ ˆ
are equivalent to
(a3) (1 - )/ x < £ ˆ.
We henceforth assume that equation a3
holds. We also assume that
(a4) 1/x³ ˆ
so that equation a3 implies satisfaction of
equation a1.19
18In this analysis, inﬂation is in-
versely related to the return on
real balances and hence to the
return on savings. However, the
intuition underlying our results
is not dependent on real bal-
ances earning the same real re-
turn as other savings instru-
ments. Higher inﬂation will also
reduce the return on savings in
economies where nominal inter-
est rate ceilings bind or where
binding reserve requirements
subject intermediaries to inﬂa-
tionary taxation. Binding inter-
est rate ceilings and reserve re-
quirements are very common in
developing countries and are
hardly unknown in the United
States. Finally, our empirical re-
sults do support the notion that
higher inﬂation does reduce the
real returns received by in-
vestors (see the section on
some empirical evidence).
19Clearly 1/x>(1-l)/lxcan
hold only if l >0.5. Equation
a4 obviously implies this.
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Figure 1
Determination of z 
Under Credit Rationing
H(z)





l sEvidently, when £ ˆ,there are two so-
lutions to equation 22. This multiplicity of
candidate equilibria derives from the way
that ﬁnancial markets respond to the pres-
ence of the adverse selection problem. To in-
duce self-selection at any given value of  ,
w(k) and (b+ ) must be linked. One way
that self-selection can occur is for w(k) and
(b+ ) both to be low; this requires that zbe
low. Alternatively,w(k) and (b+ ) can both
be relatively high; this requires that zbe
high. The possibility that there is more than
one way for ﬁnancial markets to address an
informational asymmetry has a generality
beyond this particular model, as shown by
Boyd and Smith (forthcoming) or Schreft
and Smith (forthcoming and 1994).
The Effects of Higher Inﬂation
The consequences of an increase in
the steady-state inﬂation rate are depicted
in Figure 2. Evidently, an increase in 
raises z( ) and reduces z( ) or, in other
words
holds. The same statements apply to k.
Hence, in the low- (high-) capital-stock
steady state, an increase in the inﬂation rate
raises (lowers) the steady-state capital
stock. These effects occur because an in-
crease in  reduces the steady-state return
on savings. Other things equal, this lowers
the utility of honest type 1 agents and would
cause them to misrepresent their type. To
preserve self-selection w(k) must rise rela-
tive to (b+ )=k/(1 - ). In the low- (high-)
capital-stock steady state, this requires that
krise (fall). Thus higher inﬂation exacer-
bates informational asymmetries, with im-
plications for the capital stock that are ad-
verse in the high-capital-stock steady state.
Figure 3 depicts the solutions to equa-
tion 22 as a function of  , where we de-
note by z ˆ( ) any solutions to that equa-
tion. Evidently, there can be no solution to
equation 22 if the government sets 
above  ˆ. For  satisfying equation a3,
clearly we have
Of particular interest in this context is
the possibility that an increase in the long-
run rate of inﬂation can reduce the long-run
capital stock, real activity, and productivity.
Such consequences are often observed em-
pirically when inﬂation increases, particu-
larly when the initial rate of inﬂation is rela-
tively high. This outcome is observed in the
high-capital-stock steady state. We now
want to know which, if either, steady state
can be approached under credit rationing.
Dynamics
Given an initial capital-labor ratio, k0,
and an initial level of real balances, m0,
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Inﬂation and its Consequences 
Under Credit Rationing
z z ˆ(s)
A(s)=1 ˆequations 14 and 16¢ at equality govern
the subsequent evolution of kt and mt.
The Appendix establishes our second 
result.
RESULT 2. (a) The low-capital-stock steady
state is a saddle. All {kt,mt} sequences ap -
proaching it do so monotonically. (b) The
high-capital-stock steady state is a sink if  ˆ
is not too large.
Result 2a implies that both the high-
and the low-capital-stock steady states can
potentially be approached. To approach
the low-capital-stock steady state, m0 must
be chosen to lie on a “saddle path;” that is,
there is a unique choice of m0 that allows
the economy to approach the low-capital-
stock steady state.
Result 2b implies that, for some open
set of values of k0, there is a whole inter-
val of choices of m0 that allow the high-
capital-stock steady state to be ap-
proached. The requirement of avoiding a
hyperinﬂation thus no longer implies
what m0 must be. Monetary equilibria
have become indeterminate. A continuum
of possible equilibrium values of m0 exist
and hence so does a continuum of possi-
ble equilibrium paths approaching the
high-capital-stock steady state. This is a
consequence of the informational friction
afﬂicting capital markets.
Not only is the informational asym-
metry a source of indeterminacy, it is a
potential source of endogenous economic
volatility as well. We now establish that
such volatility must be observed near the
high-capital-stock steady state whenever
the rate of inﬂation is sufﬁciently high. 
At high rates of inﬂation, the economy
must thus pay a price to avoid the 
low-capital-stock steady state: This price
is the existence of endogenous volatility
in real activity, inﬂation, and asset 
returns.
RESULT 3. Suppose that is sufﬁciently
close to  ˆ. Then all paths approaching the
high-capital-stock steady state do so nonmo -
notonically.
Result 3 is proved in the Appendix.
Summary
When ﬁnancial market frictions bind,
there can be two steady-state equilibria dif-
fering in their levels of real development.
Both steady states can potentially be ap-
proached. A continuum of paths approach-
ing the high-capital-stock steady state ex-
ists so that the operation of ﬁnancial
markets creates an indeterminacy. If the
steady-state inﬂation rate is high enough,
all such paths display endogenously arising
volatility in real activity, real returns, and





In the section on Walrasian equilibria,
we described equilibria under the assump-
tion that information about borrower type is
publicly available. In the section on equilib-
ria with credit rationing, we described can-
didate equilibria under the assumption that
equation 16¢holds as an equality. In this 
section we ask when equation 16¢will and 
will not be an equality in equilibrium. When
it is, credit rationing will occur. When it 
is not, self-selection occurs even with 
Walrasian allocations. In the former situa-
tion, ﬁnancial market frictions are severe
enough to affect the allocation of invest-
ment capital for entirely endogenous rea-
sons. In the latter situation, it transpires—
again for entirely endogenous reasons—that
ﬁnancial market frictions are not severe
enough to affect allocations. One of our
main results is that when the steady-state in-
ﬂation rate is high enough, ﬁnancial market
frictions mustmatter and credit rationing
mustoccur. Thus high enough rates of inﬂa-
tion imply that market frictions must ad-
versely affect the extension of credit and
capital formation as well.
When Are Walrasian Allocations
Consistent With Self-Selection?
When do candidate Walrasian equilib-
ria (sequences {kt,mt} satisfying equations
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1914 and 15¢ at equality) also satisfy equa-
tion 16¢? For simplicity of exposition, we
focus our discussion on steady states.
Walrasian steady states satisfy equa-
tion 16¢ when equation 17 holds and when
the implied value of k satisﬁes
(29) [w(k)/kf¢(k)]f¢(k) ³ x /(1 - ).
We have already established that
[w(k)/kf¢(k)] = a
1/ z(1+z)
(1- )/ ; hence
equation 29 is equivalent to
(30) H[z
*( )] ³ a
-1/ [x /(1 - )].
We now demonstrate our fourth result.
RESULT 4. Equation 30 is satisﬁed if and
only if  holds.
Result 4 is proved in the Appendix.
The result asserts that Walrasian alloca-
tions are consistent with self-selection if
and only if the steady-state value of z
under full information lies between the
values of z solving equation 16¢ at equality.
When this condition is satisﬁed, the Wal-
rasian allocation continues to constitute an
equilibrium, even in the presence of the
informational asymmetry. Endogenous fac-
tors allow the friction to be sufﬁciently
mild that it does not affect the allocation
of investment capital. Thus, when
Walrasian allocations
are equilibrium allocations. When
Walrasian allocations
are inconsistent with self-selection and do
not constitute legitimate equilibria.
Credit Rationing
We now ask the opposite question:
When do solutions to equation 16¢at equal-
ity satisfy equation 15¢? Since f¢(k)=a
1/ (1
+z)
(1- )/ , clearly they do so if and only if
In particular, equation 31 asserts that credit
can be rationed if and only if the solution to
equation 22 yields a lower capital stock than
would obtain under a Walrasian allocation.
This observation has the following implica-
tion: The smaller (larger) solution to equa-
tion 16¢at equality is an equilibrium if and




Here we describe the full set of steady-
state equilibria for each potential choice of
. We begin by depicting z
*( ) and z ˆ( )
simultaneously in Figure 4a and b. It is
easy to check that z
*( ) is an increasing
function, and that z
*(a
1/ ) = 0. Combining
this with our previous results about the
correspondence z ˆ( ), it follows that there
are three possible conﬁgurations of the
steady-state equilibrium correspondence.
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Figure 4a
z z ˆ(s), z*(s)
Multiple Steady States
a
-1/ s - s
z ˆ(s) z*(s)
Figure 4b









s ˆWe now brieﬂy discuss each case. The ﬁrst
case is the one of primary interest to us.
Case 1. Suppose that
Then we have the conﬁguration depicted in
Figure 4a.20The lociz
*( ) and z ˆ( ) inter-
sect twice at  and  .21
For  < ,z
*( )<z z( )holds. Hence 
neither the Walrasian situation nor the
credit rationing situation constitutes a le-
gitimate equilibrium. Then if  < , there
are no monetary steady states.
For  Î[ , ],z
*( )Î[z( ),z( )] holds.
It follows that the Walrasian steady state is
consistent with self-selection whenever
Î[ , ] and hence is a true steady-state
equilibrium. At the same time, z( ) £ z
*( )
also holds. Thus z( ) is a legitimate steady
state with credit rationing. Clearly, z( )
> z
*( ) holds for all  Î[ , ] and hence 
z( ) is not a legitimate steady state for 
< .  Thus, for  Î[ , ] exactly two
steady-state equilibria exist: one with
credit rationing and one without. Our pre-
vious results imply that both steady states
are saddles and hence that both can poten-
tially be approached.22 If credit rationing
arises, the result will be that the capital
stock is depressed. The capital stock is
low, and therefore w(k) must be low rela-
tive to (b + ) = k/(1 - ). This forces in-
termediaries to ration credit to induce self-
selection. Credit rationing can thus arise
for fully endogenous reasons.
Suppose that two intrinsically identi-
cal economies23 with  Î[ , ] land in dif-
ferent steady states. The economy with a
low capital stock will experience credit ra-
tioning, while that with a high capital
stock does not. Thus the better-developed
economy will appear to have a better func-
tioning ﬁnancial system, as in fact it does.
However, the inefﬁcient functioning of
capital markets in the poorer economy is a
purely endogenous outcome.
When  > holds, z
*( )< z( ) holds
as well. Hence Walrasian outcomes are no
longer consistent with self-selection and
they cannot be equilibria. Thus, when
steady-state inﬂation exceeds a critical
level ( ) informational frictions must inter-
fere with the operation of capital markets.
Since z z
*( ) > z( ) for all  > , both 
z( ) and z( ) constitute legitimate equilib-
ria with credit rationing. For  Î( , ˆ),
there are thus again two steady-state equi-
libria. Our previous results indicate that
one is a sink and one a saddle; hence both
can potentially be approached. In the high-
(low-) capital-stock steady state, credit ra-
tioning appears to be less (more) severe.
To summarize, in this case for 
Î( , ˆ) potentially two steady-state 
equilibria exist. In one credit market fric-
tions are relatively severe; in the other
they are less so.
We have thus far not insisted that a
steady-state equilibrium have a positive
level of real balances. Keeping this condi-
tion in mind, we present our ﬁfth result.
RESULT 5. Suppose thatA( )>1holds. Then
any steady state has positive real balances.
Result 5 is proved in the Appendix.24
In this case, then, the steady-state
equilibrium correspondence is given by
the solid locus in Figure 4b. For  £ ,
the steady-state equilibrium value of z,
and hence of k, increases with  . Thus, for
low initial rates of inﬂation, increases in 
result in higher steady-state capital stocks
and output levels (unless increases in  re-
sult in a shift from a Walrasian equilib-
rium to an equilibrium with credit ra-
tioning). However, for  > , equilibria
lying along the upper branch of this locus
will have z (and hence k) decreasing as 
increases. Thus, at high initial inﬂation
rates, increases in  can reduce long-run
output levels. This situation is very consis-
tent with the empirical evidence reviewed
in the introduction.25
Case 2. (Figure 5a).
In this case z
*( ) and z ˆ( ) (generi-
cally) have two intersections, as they did
previously. In addition, for  < there are
no steady-state equilibria, as in Case 1.
Similarly, for  Î[ , ] there are two
20Equation 32 holds if and only if
equation A19 holds, as estab-
lished in the Appendix section
on the existence of steady-state
equilibria. Thus A19 gives a
primitive condition under which
Case 1 obtains.
21The Appendix section that cov-
ers Result 6 proves that there
are at most two intersections
and that there are exactly two
intersections in this particular
case.
22The existence of two saddles is
possible because dynamical
equilibria follow different laws of
motion depending on whether a
Walrasian regime or a regime of
credit rationing pertains.
23Except, possibly, for their initial
capital stocks.
24Strictly speaking, in any steady
state with credit rationing, it is
necessary that intermediaries
perceive no arbitrage opportuni-
ties associated with “pooling”
type 2 and dissembling type 1
agents (see footnote 11). 
The Appendix establishes that
intermediaries perceive no 
such incentive, for any value 




(1 - l)ˆ 2 both are satisﬁed.
25For both outcomes to be consis-
tent with positive levels of real




either equations A27 or A28
and A29 are satisﬁed.
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21steady-state equilibria, just as in Case 1.
However, here for  Î[ , ˆ],z( ) z
*( )
holds, so that neither the Walrasian nor
the credit rationing allocations are legiti-
mate steady states. Hence steady-state
equilibria exist if and only if  Î[ , ].
The steady-state equilibrium corre-
spondence for Case 2 is depicted in Figure
5b. In this case no branch of the corre-
spondence exists for which z (and k) are
decreasing in  . Thus this case cannot eas-
ily capture the empirical observations cited
in the introduction.
Case 3.
Here holds for all  . It
follows that there are no steady-state equi-
libria for any value of  .
Discussion
Of the various possible conﬁgurations
of the steady-state equilibrium correspon-
dence, only that in Case 1 seems like it
can easily confront empirical ﬁndings like
those of Bullard and Keating (forthcom-
ing) and Bruno and Easterly (1995). We
therefore regard this as the most interest-
ing case and explore it somewhat further.
As shown in Result 3, some critical
value ( c) of the money growth rate exists,
with c< ˆ such thatforall  max {
_
, c},
equilibrium paths approaching the high-
capital-stock steady state necessarily dis-
play endogenous oscillation. Then, in par-
ticular, if  (see the Appen-
dix), there are three distinct possibilities:
• [max { ,(1- )/ x },
_
]. H e re one
steady-state equilibrium exists with credit
rationing and one exists without. Paths 
approaching both steady states do so 
monotonically. Increases in  (within this
interval) raise the capital stock in each
steady state.26
• 27Here there are two
steady-state equilibria, each displaying
credit rationing. Dynamical equilibrium
paths approaching each steady state may do
so monotonically. In the higher of the steady
states, increases in the steady-state inﬂation
rate are detrimental to capital formation and
the long-run level of real activity.
• Here there continue to be
two steady-state equilibria with credit ra-
tioning  Now equilibrium paths
approaching the high-capital-stock steady
state necessarily display endogenous ﬂuc-
tuations. This is the price paid for avoid-
ing convergence to the low-capital-stock
steady state. Moreover, if low levels of real
activity are to be avoided, high rates of
money growth induce volatility in all eco-
nomic variables, including the inﬂation
rate. High rates of inﬂation are then asso-
ciated with variable rates of inﬂation.
An Example
We now present a set of parameter val-
ues satisfying equations a4, A19 (implying
26However, increases in  can
still result in a reduction in the
steady-state capital stock if
they induce transitions from the
Walrasian to the credit rationing
regime. The current analysis
provides no guidance as to
when such transitions might or
might not occur.
27Obviously we are assuming
here that 
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z z ˆ( )
z*( )
z z ˆ( )
z z ˆ(s), z*( )
z z ˆ(s), z*( )that we have a Case 1 economy), A24¢,
A26¢ (implying that intermediaries have
no incentive to pool different agent types
in any steady-state equilibrium), and A27
[implying that (1- )/  x < 
_
].  One set of
parameter values satisfying these condi-
tions is given by  ˆ =2,  = -1, x = 1/32,  =
63/64, and a = 1/16. For these parameter
values, equation a3 reduces to  Î (0.508,
2). These parameter values imply, paren-
thetically, that the government can allow
the money supply to grow as rapidly as
100 percent per period, or could contract
the money supply by as much as 49 per-
cent per period. They also imply an empir-
ically plausible elasticity of substitution
between capital and labor of 0.5. It is also
easy to check that, for all  > (1 - )/ x,
the high-capital-stock steady state has




The theoretical analysis of the previ-
ous sections yields several predictions that
can be tested empirically.
1. Increases in the steady-state rate
of inﬂation reduce the real returns in-
vestors receive.
2. Such increases can lead to greater
inﬂation variability and also to greater
variability in the returns on all assets.
3. Higher long-run rates of inﬂation
raise steady-state output levels for
economies whose rate of inﬂation is ini-
tially low enough.28 For economies with
initially high rates of inﬂation ( ³ ) fur-
ther increases in inﬂation must reduce
long-run output levels, unless the econ-
omy is in a development trap.
4. When higher inﬂation is detri-
mental to long-run output levels, inﬂation
adversely affects the level of activity in ﬁ-
nancial markets.
As we have noted, many of these re-
sults are empirically well-supported in the
existing literature. For example, it is well-
known that higher rates of inﬂation are
typically accompanied by greater inﬂation
variability, as shown in Friedman (1992).
Similarly, the third implication listed above
is consistent with the empirical evidence
presented by Bullard and Keating (forth-
coming) and Bruno and Easterly (1995),
which we summarized in the introduction.
We now address evidence for the remain-
ing propositions.
Table 1 presents the results of four re-
gressions using stock market data for the
United States over the period 1958–93.29
The dependent variables are the growth
rate of the real value of transactions on the
New York Stock Exchange (RV); real re-
turns on the Standard & Poor’s 500 Index,
inclusive of dividends (RR); nominal re-
turns on the Standard & Poor’s Index, in-
clusive of dividends (NR); and the stan-
dard deviation of daily returns on the
Standard & Poor’s Index (V). The explana-
28As we have seen, this is true
along either branch of the
steady-state equilibrium corre-
spondence if  The state-
ment in the text does require
some qualiﬁcation, though. In
particular, as noted above, if
higher inﬂation causes the
economy to shift from the Wal-
rasian to the credit rationed
equilibrium for  then an
increase in the inﬂation rate can
cause long-run output to fall.
29Data sources are listed in the
Appendix.
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2= .03, DW = 1.97, Q(60) = 77.7
(2)





2= .09, Q(60) = 56.2
(3)





2= .06, Q(60) = 56.4
(4)





2= .02, DW = 1.99, Q(60) = 71.5
Table 1
* Monthly, 1958-93.
† Denotes that a Cochrane-Orcutt procedure has been employed.
‡ Denotes signiﬁcance at the 5 percent level or higher.
Standard errors are in parentheses.
DW: Durbin-Watson statistic
Q: Ljung-Box Q statistictory variable of interest is the rate of inﬂa-
tion in the Consumer Price Index (INF).
Other explanatory variables are also em-
ployed. However, the results appear to be
quite robust to the inclusion of other ex-
planatory variables. These regressions were
selected as being representative of a much
larger set that we estimated. Finally, all
data are reported as deviations from their
sample means,30 and pass standard station-
arity tests in that form. In some regres-
sions we corrected for serial correlation
using a Cochrane-Orcutt procedure.
As is apparent from Table 1, higher rates
of inﬂation signiﬁcantly reduce the growth
rate of stock market transactions. As pre-
dicted by theory, higher inﬂation thus atten-
uates ﬁnancial market activity. In addition,
as the inﬂation rate rises, the real return re-
ceived by investors falls signiﬁcantly.31In-
deed, over this time period even nominal re-
turns to investors appear to be negatively
associated with inﬂation. Finally, higher in-
ﬂation increases the volatility of stock re-
turns. All of these results are consistent with
the predictions of our model.
Figure 6 depicts the ratio of the value of
stock market transactions (on the New York
Stock Exchange) to gross domestic product
(GDP), plotted against the rate of inﬂation.
Apparently, higher inﬂation rates also tend
to reduce the level of ﬁnancial market activ-
ity using this particular measure.
30We also ran the regressions re-
ported without removing the
sample means. This led to no dif-
ferences in results.
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C h i l e
(1)




2= .10, DW = 2.24, Q(33) = 25.5
(2)






2= .19, Q(33) = 19.9
(3)






2= .09, Q(33) = 19.7
Table 2
* Monthly, 1981-91.
† Denotes signiﬁcance at the 5 percent level or higher.
Standard errors are in parentheses.
DW: Durbin-Watson statistic
Q: Ljung-Box Q statistic
Figure 6
Ratio of the Value of Stock Market Transactions to GDP:
United States
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Figure 7
Ratio of the Value of Stock Market Transactions to GDP:
Chile











8.0 12.0 16.0 20.0 24.0 28.0 32.0
Inﬂation (%)Table 2 reports the results of estimat-
ing similar regressions using stock market
data from Chile. Here RV represents the
growth rate of the real value of stock
market transactions on the Santiago Stock
Exchange, and RRAT is the real interest
rate on 30–89 day bank deposits. A lack
of daily data prevents us from examining
the volatility of stock market returns. As
in the case of the United States, we see
that higher rates of inﬂation signiﬁcantly
reduce investors’ real and nominal rates 
of return on the stock exchange. The
point estimate suggests that higher inﬂa-
tion also depresses the growth rate of
market transactions, although here the
31Boudoukh and Richardson
(1993), using a much longer
time series, also ﬁnd that higher
rates of inﬂation have reduced
real stock market returns in the
United States and in the United
Kingdom.
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K o r e a
A. 1982-87
(1)
RVt= .01 + .12 V(t) – .008 GIP(t) – .12 INF(t)
(.05)(.13) (.008) (.1)
R
2= .04, DW = 2.3, Q(24) = 33.2
(2)
RRt= .00 – .17 RR(t–1) + .25 V(t) – 1.69 RRAT(t) – 2.32 INF(t)
(.72)(.12) (1.9) (4.50) (4.50)
R
2 = .03, Q(24) = 17.6
(3)
Vt




2 = .39, DW = 2.34, Q(24) = 15.6
B. 1988-94
(1)






2= .11, DW = 2.15, Q(27) = 29.4
(2)





2= .11, Q(27) = 34.8
(3)
NRt= –.23 – .23 NR(t–1) + 2.5 V(t) – 5.43 RRAT(t) – 7.11 INF(t)
(.73)(.11)
‡ (1.72) (3.36) (3.63)
‡
R
2= .10, Q(27) = 32.1
(4)
Vt




2= .08, DW = 1.95, Q(24) = 33.0
Table 3
* Monthly.
† Denotes that a Cochrane-Orcutt procedure has been employed.
‡ Denotes signiﬁcance at the 5 percent level or higher.
Standard errors are in parentheses.
DW: Durbin-Watson statistic
Q: Ljung-Box Q statistic
Regressions from 
Stock Market Data*:
Ta i w a n
A. 1983-88
(1)




2= .08, DW = 1.8, Q(24) = 13.4
(2)












2= .11, DW = 1.88, Q(21) = 14.1
(2)





2= .21, Q(24) = 26.8
(3)





2= .17, Q(24) = 25.4
Table 4
* Monthly.
† Denotes signiﬁcance at the 5 percent level or higher.
‡ Denotes that a Cochrane-Orcutt procedure has been employed.
Standard errors are in parentheses.
DW: Durbin-Watson statistic
Q: Ljung-Box Q statisticpoint estimate is not signiﬁcantly different
from zero.
Figure 7 depicts the ratio of the value
of stock market transactions to GDP for
Chile, plotted against its rate of inﬂation.
Again we perceive a negative relationship,
particularly if the one single-digit inﬂation
year (1982) is excluded as an outlier.
Tables 3 and 4 report analogous regres-
sion results for Korea and Taiwan. Here we
proceed somewhat differently, since both
Korea and Taiwan experienced fairly pro-
nounced jumps in their rates of inﬂation in
1988 and 1989, respectively. In particular,
in Korea the average monthly inﬂation rate
was 0.27 percent over the period 1982–87,
while from 1988–94 it was 0.54 percent. In
Taiwan, the average monthly rate of inﬂa-
tion over the period 1983–88 was 0.07 per-
cent, but jumped to 0.33 percent from
1989–93. These increases are apparent in
Figures 8 and 9, respectively.
In view of these marked changes in
the inﬂation rate, we proceeded as follows.
For each country we divided the sample
and ran regressions analogous to those re-
ported above. For Korea the results are re-
ported in Table 3. Over the low inﬂation
period (1982–87), inﬂation has no signiﬁ-
cant effects on the real return on equity, its
volatility, or on the growth rate of stock
market transactions. However, during the
period of higher inﬂation, increases in the
rate of inﬂation lead to statistically signiﬁ-
cant reductions in the growth rate of
transactions and the real and nominal re-
turn on equity. With respect to the volatil-
ity of market returns, our point estimates
again suggest that inﬂation leads to higher
volatility, but the inﬂation coefﬁcient is
not signiﬁcantly different from zero.
Figure 8 represents Korea’s ratio of the
value of stock market transactions to GDP
and its rate of inﬂation. Clearly, in the
higher inﬂation period of 1988–93, the
negative relationship between market ac-
tivity and the rate of inﬂation is highly
pronounced. This is not the case for the
low-inﬂation period 1982–87. Here then
we see some evidence for threshold effects:
Inﬂation seems to have signiﬁcant adverse
consequences only after it exceeds some
critical level.
Table 4 repeats the same regression
procedure for Taiwan, but lack of daily
data prevents us from constructing a
volatility of returns measure. Here we see a
similar pattern to that for Korea. During
the period of low inﬂation (1983–88), the
MAY/ JU N E 1 9 9 6
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Figure 8
Ratio of the Value of Stock Market 
Transactions to GDP: Korea













Ratio of the Value of Stock Market 
Transactions to GDP: Taiwan
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Inﬂation (%)effect of inﬂation on the growth rate of
real stock market activity is insigniﬁcant
and similarly for the real returns on equity.
However, in the period of high inﬂation,
both the growth rate of real equity market
activity and the real returns on equity
were adversely effected by inﬂation in a
statistically signiﬁcant way. Nominal eq-
uity returns are negatively associated with
inﬂation, with a t-value of about 1.6. Here
we see further evidence that inﬂation may
be detrimental only after it exceeds some
threshold level.
Figure 9 displays Taiwan’s value of
stock market transactions to GDP ratio, as
well as its inﬂation rate. Clearly, this mea-
sure does not suggest that inﬂation has
been detrimental to the level of equity
market activity.
Table 5 shows simple correlations of
the ﬁnancial variables with the inﬂation
rate for each of the countries and subperi-
ods. These results are quite consistent with
the regression results. On the whole, this
empirical evidence seems to support our
model’s predictions. We have even seen ev-
idence that inﬂation’s adverse conse-
quences may only be observed if the rate
of inﬂation is sufﬁciently high.
CONCLUSIONS
Both our theoretical analysis and our
empirical evidence indicate that higher rates
of inﬂation tend to reduce the real rates of
return received by savers in a variety of mar-
kets.32When credit is rationed, this reduc-
tion in returns worsens informational fric-
tions that interfere with the operation of the
ﬁnancial system. Once inﬂation exceeds a
certain critical rate, a potential consequence
is that the ﬁnancial system provides less in-
vestment capital, resulting in reduced capi-
tal formation and long-run levels of real ac-
tivity. Such forces need not operate at low
rates of inﬂation, providing an explanation
of why the consequences of higher inﬂation
seem to be so much more severe once inﬂa-
tion exceeds some threshold level.
In addition, high enough rates of inﬂa-
tion force endogenously arising economic
volatility to be observed. Thus, as we ob-
serve, high inﬂation induces inﬂation vari-
ability and variability in rates of return on
all savings instruments. Theory predicts
that this volatility should be transmitted to
real activity as well.
Obviously, these results have been ob-
tained in the context of a highly stylized
and simpliﬁed model of the ﬁnancial sys-
tem. How general are they? We believe
they are quite general. Boyd and Smith
(forthcoming) produce a model of a ﬁnan-
cial system that is subject to a costly state
veriﬁcation problem, one where investors
provide some internal ﬁnancing of their
own investment projects. Again, two mon-
etary steady-state equilibria exist and both
32Further evidence on this point
appears in Boyd, Levine, and
Smith (1995).
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Comparisons Across Countries: Simple Correlations of Market and







Variable 1958-93 1981-91 1982-87 1988-94 1983-88 1989-93
RV –.06 –.02 –.12 –.19 –.12 –.20
RR –.25 –.15 –.06 –.20 –.12 –.23
V –.05 — –.09 –.12 — —
GIP –.02 –.10 –.14 –.03 –.12 –.24
RRAT –.70 –.67 –.95 –.91 –.99 –.99
Table 5
* Average monthly inﬂation rate 0.27 percent.
† Average monthly inﬂation rate 0.54 percent.
‡ Average monthly inﬂation rate 0.07 percent.
§ Average monthly inﬂation rate 0.33 percent.can potentially be approached. Thus devel-
opment trap phenomena arise. In the
steady state with higher levels of real ac-
tivity, higher inﬂation interferes with the
provision of internal ﬁnance, thereby exac-
erbating the costly state veriﬁcation prob-
lem. As a result, greater inﬂation reduces
the long-run level of real activity, the level
of ﬁnancial market activity, and real re-
turns to savers. Moreover, as is the case
here, high enough rates of inﬂation force
endogenously generated economic volatil-
ity to emerge. And, interestingly, Boyd and
Smith (forthcoming) obtain a result that is
not available here: Once inﬂation exceeds
a critical level, it is possible that only the
low-activity steady state can be ap-
proached. Inﬂation rates exceeding this
level can then force the kinds of crises dis-
cussed by Bruno and Easterly (1995). Re-
lated results are obtained by Schreft and
Smith (forthcoming and 1994) in models
where ﬁnancial market frictions take the
form of limited communication, as in
Townsend (1987) and Champ, Smith, and
Williamson (forthcoming).
A shortcoming of all of the models
mentioned—including ours—is that they
do not give rise to distinct and/or interest-
ing roles for debt and equity markets. Em-
pirical evidence suggests that both kinds
of markets are adversely affected by high
inﬂation.33 This is a natural topic for fu-
ture investigation.
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PROOF OF RESULT 1
It will be useful to begin by describing
some properties of the function H(z)º
z(1+z)
(1- )/ . Clearly , H(0) =0, and
(A1) lim H(z) = 0
z ¥
is established by an application of L’Hopital’s
rule. Moreover, clearly,
(A2) z H(z) /H(z) =1 +[(1 - ) / ][z/ ( 1+z)].
Thus H (z)³(<) 0 holds if and only if 
z³(<)- .
It follows from these observations 
that equation 22 has a solution if and only
if equation 26 holds. This is readily veriﬁed
to be equivalent to  ³ ˆ,with  ˆ deﬁned by
equation 25.
When equation 22 has a solution, the as-
sociated value of kcan be obtained fro m
equation 19. Equation 23 then produces m.
E v i d e n t l y, mis positive if and only if A( ) >1 .
PROOF OF RESULT 2
Using equation 14 to replace kt+1 in
equation 16 gives the relation
(A3) mt 1=A( )mt [x/(1 )]mt
2/w(kt).
Equations 14 and A3 govern the evolution
of the sequence {kt,mt}. Near a steady state
this evolution is described by a linear ap-
proximation of these two equations. Letting
(k,m) denote any pair of steady-state equi-
librium values for the capital-labor ratio and
real balances, this linear approximation is
given by (kt+1-k,mt+1-m)¢=J(kt-k,mt-m)¢,




2w¢(k)   2 A(
Let T( ) and D( ) denote the trace and de-
terminant, respectively, of J, where we ex-
plicitly denote their dependence on  .
It is well-known from Azariadis (1993,
chapter 6.4) that a steady state is a saddle
if T( ) > 1 + D( ). A steady state is a sink
if |D( )| < 1 and  1 D( ) < T( ) < 1 +
D( ).
We now state the following prelimi-
nary result.
LEMMA 1. At the low (high) capital stock
steady state, D( ) > (<) 1 holds.
Proof. It is straightforward to show that
(A4) D( ) = (1 - )/[1 z ˆ( )].
Since z( ) - [z( ) > - ],D( )>(<)1 
holds at the low- (high-) capital-stock
steady state.
It is now possible to demonstrate the
following.
LEMMA 2. At the low- (high-) capital-stock
steady state, T( ) > (<) 1 + D( ) holds.
Proof. As is readily veriﬁed,
(A5) T( ) = 2 - A( ) + A( )D( ).
Thus T( ) > (<) 1 + D( ) holds if and
only if
(A6) [A( ) - 1]D( ) > (<) [A( ) - 1].
A( ) > 1 and Lemma 1 implies that 
> (<) holds at the low- (high-) capital-
stock steady state.
Lemma 2 implies that the low-capital-
stock steady state is a saddle. Paths ap-
proaching it necessarily do so monoton-
ically if T( ) > 0 at that steady state. But
T( ) > 0 follows from equation A5 and
Lemma1. Thus Result 2(a) is established.
Lemmas 1 and 2 also imply that the
high-capital-stock steady state is a sink if
(A7) T( ) > -1 - D( )
holds at that steady state. By equation A5,
equation A7 is equivalent to
AppendixMAY/ JU N E 1 9 9 6
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(A7¢) D( ) > [A( ) - 3]/[A( ) + 1].
Equation A4 implies that equation A7¢
necessarily holds if 3 ³ A( ), which in turn
is implied by 3 ³ A(ˆ) The high-capital-
stock steady state is thus a sink, if ˆ is not
too large.
PROOF OF RESULT 3
It is well-known that paths approach-
ing a steady state do so nonmonotonically
if T( )
2 < 4D( ) holds, as in Azariadis
(1993, chapter 6.4). We ﬁrst establish the
following.
LEMMA 3. T( ) > 0 holds if  is sufﬁciently
close to ˆ.
Proof. From equation A5, T( ) > 0 holds if
(A8) 2 > A( )[1 - D( )]
where at the high-capital-stock steady state
(A9) D( ) = (1 - ) / [1 z( )].
Thus 
It follows that equation A8 necessarily
holds for large enough values of  .
Lemma 3 implies that T( )
2 < 4D( )
holds for large enough  if and only if
(A10) T( ) 2 D( ).
Substituting equation A5 into equation A10
and rearranging terms yields the equivalent
condition
(A10¢) 2[1 D( )]
A( )[1 D( )][1 D( )]
or, since D( ) < 1,
(A11) [2 A( )]/A( )< D( ).
We now show that equation A11 holds for
= ˆ and hence by continuity, that it holds
for  sufﬁciently near ˆ. In particular,
{2-[x / (1 - )] ˆ }/[x / (1 - )ˆ]
while
Thus equation A11 holds for  near  ˆ if
(A12) 2 [x /(1 - )] ˆ <[x /(1 - )]ˆ.
But equation A12 is implied by A(ˆ)>1.
This establishes the result.
PROOF OF RESULT 4
z( ) and z( ) both satisfy
H(z) = a
1/ [x /(1 - )].
Thus z
*( ) satisﬁes equation 30 if and
only if  holds. As is ap-
parent from Figure1, this will be the case
if and only if 
RESULT 6
z
*( ) intersects z ˆ( ) at most twice.
Proof. z
*( ) satisﬁes
(A13) [1 + z
*( )]
(1- )/ º a
-1/ / .
Multiplying both sides of equation A13 by
z
*( ) gives the equivalent condition
(A13¢)H[z




*( ) = z ˆ( ), we have
(A14) H[z
*( )] = H[z ˆ( )]
º a
1/ [x / (1 - )].
Equations A13¢and A14 imply that 
z
*( )=z ˆ( ) if and only if
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(A15) z
*( ) = [x/(1 - )]
2.
Equation A15 is readily shown to be






The function Q( ) is depicted in the
Figure. It is readily demonstrated that 
Q(a
-1/ ) > a
-1/(1- ) and that Q¢( ) ³ 0 holds
if and only if
(A16) ³ [- (1- )/x(2- )]
0.5.




1/ < [- (1 - )/x(2 - )]
0.5
and that
(A18) Q{[- (1 - )/x(2 - )]
0.5} < a
-1/(1- ).
Then equation A15¢ has exactly two 
solutions, as shown in the Figure. It fol-
lows that z
*( ) intersects z ˆ( ) exactly
twice.
Case 2.
Suppose that equation A17 holds but
that equation A18 fails. Then there is at
most one intersection of z
*( ) and z ˆ( ), 
as shown in the Figure.
Case 3.
Suppose that equation A17 fails. Then
Q ( )³0 holds for all  ³a
1/ . There are no
intersections of z
*( ) and z ˆ( ), as the Figure
shows.
These three cases exhaust the set of
possibilities and establish the result.
EXISTENCE OF STEADY-
STATE EQUILIBRIA
Result 6 implies that steady-state equi-
libria exist, in general, if and only if  sat-
isﬁes equation a3 and equations A17 and
A18 hold. It will be useful to have a sufﬁ-
cient condition implying that equations
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it is apparent that z
*( ) intersects 
z ˆ( ) if z
*(ˆ) >- . We now describe when
this condition holds.
RESULT 7. z
*(ˆ) >- holds if and only if
(A19) ˆ >[- (1 - )/x]
0.5.
Proof. Equations 20 and 25 imply that
z




< - [(1- )
(1 )/ ]
2.
Equation A20 is easily shown to be equiv-
alent to equation A19.
Thus equation A19 implies the existence
of multiple steady states for all  satisfying
equation a3.
PROOF OF RESULT 5
This result has already been estab-
lished when credit rationing obtains. Thus
we must establish that m > 0 holds at the
Walrasian steady state. From equation 18,
in a Walrasian steady state
(A21) m = k{ [w(k)/k] - 1}.
Since z
*( )Î[z( ),z( )], we also have
that w(k)/k ³ x /(1 - ). Hence A( ) > 1
implies that m > 0 holds.
IMPOSSIBILITY OF 
POOLING
Azariadis and Smith (forthcoming)
prove that there is never an incentive 
for an intermediary to pool type 2 and
dissembling type 1 agents in a Walrasian
equilibrium. They also prove that there
is no such incentive under credit ration-
ing if
(A22) 1 ³ (1 - )f (k)
= (1 - )a
1/ [1 + z ˆ( )]
(1 )/
or equivalently, if
(A22¢) z ˆ( ) ³ (1 - )a
1/rH[z ˆ( )]ºx
2.
Equation A22¢holds at the high-capital-
stock steady state if
(A23) z( )/
2 ³ x.
Since the left-hand side of equation A23 
is decreasing in  , A23 holds for all 
£ ˆ if
(A24) z(ˆ)/x³ ˆ 2.
or equivalently, if
(A24¢) - /x³ ˆ 2.
Equation A22¢ holds at the low-capital-
stock steady state if
(A25) z( )/
2³x.
Clearly, a sufﬁcient condition for equation
A25 is that
(A26) z( )³x ˆ 2.
Since z( )=[x/(1 - )]
2it follows that
(A26¢)
2³(1 - ) ˆ 2
is sufﬁcient for equation A22¢to hold at the
low-capital-stock steady state.
To summarize, equation A22¢ holds at
z( ) and z( ) for all  Î[ , ˆ ]if equations
A24¢ and A26¢ hold.
RESULT 8
if and only if
(A27) ˆ ³- (1 - )
(1 )/ ´
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(A28) (1 - )/x < [- (1 - )/x(2 - )]
0.5
and





Proof. It is easy to verify that 
(1- )/ xÎ[ , ] if and only if
(A30) Q[(1 - )/x ] £ a
-1/(1- )
holds. Using the deﬁnition of Q, it is
straightforward to show that equation A30
is equivalent to
(A30¢) -a
1/ [x/(1- )] (1- )
(1- )/
³ - (1- )
(1- )/ ´
{1 + [(1- )/x
2]}
-(1- )/ .
But, as is apparent from equation 25, 
equation A30¢ is equivalent to equation
A27.
It can be shown that (1- )x ³
holds if and only if Q¢[(1-l)/xl] < 0 and
Q[(1-l)/xl] ³ a
-1/(1- ) are satisﬁed. The
former condition is equation A28, the lat-
ter is equation A29.
DATA SOURCES
1. United States
Monthly data are available over the
period 1958–93.
Sources.
RV: Growth rate of real value of
transactions on the New York
Stock Exchange. (New York
Stock Exchange Factbook, vari-
ous dates.)
RR: Real returns on the Standard &
Poor’s 500 index, inclusive of
dividend yields. (Standard &
Poor’s Statistics, SBBI Yearbook,
various dates.)
NR: Nominal returns on the Stan-
dard & Poor’s 500 index, inclu-
sive of dividend yields. (Stan-
dard & Poor’s Statistics, SBBI
Yearbook, various dates.)
V: Standard deviation of returns
on the daily Standard & Poor’s
index. (SBBI Yearbook,various
dates.)
INF: Rate of inﬂation in the CPI.
(Bureau of Labor Statistics.)
GIP: Growth rate of industrial pro-
duction index. (Federal Re-
serve Industrial Production 
Indices.)
RRAT: Three-month Treasury bill rate,




All data are from the Boletoin mensual
(Banco Central de Chile). They are avail-
able monthly from 1981–91.
RV: Growth rate of the real value of
transactions on the Santiago
Stock Exchange.
RR: Real return to equity, inclusive
of dividend yields.
NR: Nominal returns to equity, in-
clusive of dividend yields.
INF: Rate of change in the CPI.
RRAT: Real rate of interest on 30- to
89-day bank deposits.
3. Korea
All monthly data are available from
1982–94.
Sources.
RV: Growth rate of the real value of
transactions on the Korea
Stock Exchange. (Securities
Statistics Monthly, Korea Stock
Exchange, various dates.)
RR: Real returns to equity, inclusive
of dividend yields. (Securities
Statistics Monthly, Korea Stock
Exchange, various dates.)
NR: Nominal returns to equity, in-
clusive of dividend yields. (Se -
curities Statistics Monthly,
Korea Stock Exchange, various
dates.)
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V: Standard deviation of daily re-
turns. (Securities Statistics
Monthly, Korea Stock Ex-
change, various dates.)
INF: Rate of growth of the CPI.
(Economic Statistics Yearbook,
Bank of Korea, various 
dates.)
GIP: Growth rate of industrial pro-
duction. (Economic Statistics
Yearbook, Bank of Korea, vari-
ous dates.)
RRAT: Three-month corporate bill
rate, in real terms.
4. Taiwan
All data are available monthly from
1983–93.
Sources.
RV: Growth rate of the real value of
stock transactions in the Tai-
wan area. (Financial Statistics
Monthly, Central Bank of
China, various dates.)
RR: Real returns, inclusive of divi-
dend yields. (Financial Statis -
tics Monthly, Central Bank of
China, various dates.)
NR: Nominal returns, inclusive of
dividend yields. (Financial Sta -
tistics Monthly, Central Bank of
China, various dates.)
INF: Growth rate of CPI. (Monthly
Statistics of the Republic of
China, Central Bank of China,
various dates.)
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